Saturday, April 02, 2005
The British Embassy in Abidjan Closed Till Further Notice. Why?
Because of security concerns, as of 1st April, the British Embassy in Abidjan is closed pending a review of the situation in June 2005. Click here for the official F&CO statement and the F&CO Travel Advice page. (The site is deadly slow, even with ADSL.)
Inter alia it says: "This decision is mainly due to the uncertain security situation and our inability to protect staff or British Nationals should there be another outbreak of violence. But it also reflects the lack of progress in the peace process. Until all parties genuinely commit to finding a political solution, there is little point in us remaining; the risk is just too high." This statement contains no surprises as even Kofi Anan has commented on the lack of progress and the dangers.
Some observers are at something of a loss as to why this decision has been taken at the very time when the Mbeki mediation is gathering the political parties at Pretoria. Even Blé Goudé has appeared on national television to say he does not understand why the British took this decision. After all, he said, the "Patriots" cancelled their Yamoussoukro march at the last moment.
As they are wont to do, part of the pro-régime press, such as L’Intelligent d’Abidjan, has tried to move the problem elsewhere. This paper maintains that P.M. Blair is reacting in rage to what the paper calls the recent love affair between Gbabo and Mugabe, and wants to “punish” Gbagbo (as if the departure of a handful of British is somehow going to do that!). In any case, Canada and Austria have recently announced the end of their co-operation programmes with Ivory Coast, and a couple of other European embassies have closed/are closing since the November incidents.
So what the Intelligent d’Abidjan article says probably has no truth at all so far as the reason is concerned, albeit one might question the good sense or otherwise of someone who makes of Mugabe a new-found friend at this stage of his political career.
Below are my comments arising from the Intelligent d'Abidjan article. There I am also responding to queries sent to me by Listserv members after the British Embassy closure decision:
1) The Brits may have of late shown more of a tendency towards diarrhoea than the other Embassies, even the Americans. And it is hard to know to what extent the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is "trying to send a message" to the Gbagbo regime, with its parallel Defence Ministry, etc., and its hawks.
2) There is obviously a general concern that if it goes bad in Pretoria, it could quickly go very bad here in Abidjan. Hence the British move before rather than after the Pretoria talks. Witness the fact that Air Chance has already cancelled its flights for today and tomorrow Sunday. And for Monday? And if the "street" does not like what Gbagbo agrees to in Pretoria? Or if the hoodlums are called out into the streets because the President himself, after reflection, does not like what he has to concede? Shades of the Marcoussis-rue Kléber agreements and their following anti-French riots!
3) The militias (and the “patriotes alimentaires”) are under tenuous control -- and the money distributed to them is not getting to the rank and file who could end up doing anything once let onto the streets. Everyone wants their "mangement" in these difficult times.
4) Blé Goudé and his ilk are able to get away with saying almost anything inflammatory - which is dangerous. Once again violence against the French (and apparently not just the French troops) is being preached. Among the GPP there is apparently talk of Iraqi-like kamakazi efforts. (Even an FPI spokesman has proposed unarmed civilians rolling gas bottles under the French vehicles.) "Marshall" Eugène Dué has threatened violence, including using "all means" to achieve the departure of the French troops by April 15. And it is not without reason that Blé Goudé is nick-named "Israel".
5) The Blé Goudé movement has been allowed to march and demonstrate against the French at Duékoué, Bangolo, San Pedro and other places, in spite of the demonstration ban applied in Abidjan -- which has given them national TV and radio coverage.
6) There has been no real indication that there is the political will to move ahead. Gbagbo and the FPI have for too long been dancing the tango and are now constantly repeating a disarmament mantra but have done nothing (even legislative, as Alan Doss, UN, has pointed out) to gain the confidence of those in the north who are waiting for the political questions to be settled -- or in the the west, which will always be a more complicated situation because of the assassination of Guéi and the ethnic tensions.
7) The CEMA Mangou's speech before Gbagbo at Mama was not really one espousing the peace option, with his “jusqu’au-boutisme”.
8) In the west there has been a serious breach of the peace in the try-on against the rebels at Logoualé (with armed "unarmed" militiamen, tenuously linked to the regime and Blé Goudé, according to most accounts), and the regime has not condemned that by punishing the guilty parties but rather has tried to excuse it ("poussée de fièvre", dixit Gbagbo). And that may encourage more attacks there (and elsewhere), complicated by the fact that Liberians have since the beginning been encouraged to take part in the problems there.
9) At several points, the FANCI are trying irritation movements and try-ons against the UN troops. Either side could commit an error leading to a boil-over against Licorne-ONUCI and others in Abidjan.
10) The west, particularly around Gagnoa, Daloa, etc., especially the peasants and young people, has been politicised by the “patriots”, almost as much as the Abidjan student movement. This could lead to almost anything, but already there have been human rights incidents and deaths.
11) The FANCI have stopped at least one tanker of fuel moving up to rebel-held Bouna which needs it for their electricity generators. This has led to a northern threat of an attack against Bondoukou, which, if it took place, could lead to any sort of an escalation. I do not think the UN has yet been able to resolve this problem which is yet another provocation.
12) The French have said in rather clear terms that they are now not able to assure the safety of French and eligibles in Abidjan, if it goes bad. They may not be able to hold the airport and may not be able to mount rescue operations for those in danger, as in November and earlier, in January 2003. For some time they have, therefore, been telling French citizens not to come to RCI for any reason whatsoever.
13) With MOD troops busy in other losing wars, the Brits themselves cannot mount yet another evacuation as in November (which was supposed to be a one-off show). Others (even the Americans) have only a handful of commandos, not even enough for diplomatic protection. They do not even have enough troops to guard assembly points which, this time, at their "town hall meeting” on Thursday, have been exceptionally announced ahead of happenings.
14) Nothing can be put forward to give reassurance about the future security situation of expats in Abidjan. True, it's not as dangerous here for expat kids as in the Minnesota or other American schools, inner cities or suburbs, or for expat workers as the oil region of Nigeria. BUT if the streets go bad, the police and military are not likely to help expats at all (perhaps the contrary, as in November) and the French troops will have enough problems of their own. The general insecurity is not helped by the fact that hardened criminals have been let out of the Yopougon prison, on the most recent occasion with national TV covering the event live!!
15) If the young thugs and followers are again called into the streets of Abidjan, there could well be anarchy and violence such as not witnessed before. Nobody can be sure of reining them in. The more so as young RDR people are saying that they are poor also, and next time they too will "eat", and not just from French businesses and homes.
16) The tendency of President Gbagbo towards Mugabeism, letting the country go to ruin, in the quest for some sort of self-assertion and independence from the French, is probably just seen as a sad reality in London, but not as their motivation.
I have no doubt forgotten to mention significant things, like the economic mess which can bring social problems and disturbances in its train. Strikes have already been announced, and even police demonstrated this past week.
It does not look good. Maybe after Pretoria things will improve. None of us has the gift of prophecy and the British Foreign and Commonweath Office has surely decided, as they said, to just act on the side of caution for the sake of their Embassy staff and those other Brits and protected citizens prepared and able to heed its advice.
Because of security concerns, as of 1st April, the British Embassy in Abidjan is closed pending a review of the situation in June 2005. Click here for the official F&CO statement and the F&CO Travel Advice page. (The site is deadly slow, even with ADSL.)
Inter alia it says: "This decision is mainly due to the uncertain security situation and our inability to protect staff or British Nationals should there be another outbreak of violence. But it also reflects the lack of progress in the peace process. Until all parties genuinely commit to finding a political solution, there is little point in us remaining; the risk is just too high." This statement contains no surprises as even Kofi Anan has commented on the lack of progress and the dangers.
Some observers are at something of a loss as to why this decision has been taken at the very time when the Mbeki mediation is gathering the political parties at Pretoria. Even Blé Goudé has appeared on national television to say he does not understand why the British took this decision. After all, he said, the "Patriots" cancelled their Yamoussoukro march at the last moment.
"General" Blé Goudé at the Plateau (downtown Abidjan) on 18/3/2005
launching his abortive red bandana campaign against the French forces.
The idea was that all young people would wear a bandana
in support of the “French Out” campaign,
as they were not allowed to demonstrate in the streets of Abidjan.
Sadly, the bandanas did not sell as expected.
launching his abortive red bandana campaign against the French forces.
The idea was that all young people would wear a bandana
in support of the “French Out” campaign,
as they were not allowed to demonstrate in the streets of Abidjan.
Sadly, the bandanas did not sell as expected.
As they are wont to do, part of the pro-régime press, such as L’Intelligent d’Abidjan, has tried to move the problem elsewhere. This paper maintains that P.M. Blair is reacting in rage to what the paper calls the recent love affair between Gbabo and Mugabe, and wants to “punish” Gbagbo (as if the departure of a handful of British is somehow going to do that!). In any case, Canada and Austria have recently announced the end of their co-operation programmes with Ivory Coast, and a couple of other European embassies have closed/are closing since the November incidents.
So what the Intelligent d’Abidjan article says probably has no truth at all so far as the reason is concerned, albeit one might question the good sense or otherwise of someone who makes of Mugabe a new-found friend at this stage of his political career.
Below are my comments arising from the Intelligent d'Abidjan article. There I am also responding to queries sent to me by Listserv members after the British Embassy closure decision:
1) The Brits may have of late shown more of a tendency towards diarrhoea than the other Embassies, even the Americans. And it is hard to know to what extent the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is "trying to send a message" to the Gbagbo regime, with its parallel Defence Ministry, etc., and its hawks.
2) There is obviously a general concern that if it goes bad in Pretoria, it could quickly go very bad here in Abidjan. Hence the British move before rather than after the Pretoria talks. Witness the fact that Air Chance has already cancelled its flights for today and tomorrow Sunday. And for Monday? And if the "street" does not like what Gbagbo agrees to in Pretoria? Or if the hoodlums are called out into the streets because the President himself, after reflection, does not like what he has to concede? Shades of the Marcoussis-rue Kléber agreements and their following anti-French riots!
Flashback: Destruction at the French Cultural Centre 26/1/2003
following the Marcoussis peace agreements
following the Marcoussis peace agreements
3) The militias (and the “patriotes alimentaires”) are under tenuous control -- and the money distributed to them is not getting to the rank and file who could end up doing anything once let onto the streets. Everyone wants their "mangement" in these difficult times.
A well-financed campaign is still continuing - sponsored by the FPI and others -
against the French "Unicorn" force participation in the UN peace-keeping forces.
However, the French will certainly be here with a UN Security Council mandate
for at least a month and perhaps a year or more.
In theory they were expected to be here till after the whole electoral process. *
The other UN forces here are not as capable and well-equipped
to prevent incursions and attacks by both sides.
against the French "Unicorn" force participation in the UN peace-keeping forces.
However, the French will certainly be here with a UN Security Council mandate
for at least a month and perhaps a year or more.
In theory they were expected to be here till after the whole electoral process. *
The other UN forces here are not as capable and well-equipped
to prevent incursions and attacks by both sides.
4) Blé Goudé and his ilk are able to get away with saying almost anything inflammatory - which is dangerous. Once again violence against the French (and apparently not just the French troops) is being preached. Among the GPP there is apparently talk of Iraqi-like kamakazi efforts. (Even an FPI spokesman has proposed unarmed civilians rolling gas bottles under the French vehicles.) "Marshall" Eugène Dué has threatened violence, including using "all means" to achieve the departure of the French troops by April 15. And it is not without reason that Blé Goudé is nick-named "Israel".
"Young Patriots" in Abidjan
at the launching of Blé Goudé's "French Out" red bandana campaign
at the launching of Blé Goudé's "French Out" red bandana campaign
5) The Blé Goudé movement has been allowed to march and demonstrate against the French at Duékoué, Bangolo, San Pedro and other places, in spite of the demonstration ban applied in Abidjan -- which has given them national TV and radio coverage.
About 2000 young people were organised at Duékoué on 19/3/2005
to demonstrate against the French military presence in Ivory Coast
to demonstrate against the French military presence in Ivory Coast
6) There has been no real indication that there is the political will to move ahead. Gbagbo and the FPI have for too long been dancing the tango and are now constantly repeating a disarmament mantra but have done nothing (even legislative, as Alan Doss, UN, has pointed out) to gain the confidence of those in the north who are waiting for the political questions to be settled -- or in the the west, which will always be a more complicated situation because of the assassination of Guéi and the ethnic tensions.
7) The CEMA Mangou's speech before Gbagbo at Mama was not really one espousing the peace option, with his “jusqu’au-boutisme”.
8) In the west there has been a serious breach of the peace in the try-on against the rebels at Logoualé (with armed "unarmed" militiamen, tenuously linked to the regime and Blé Goudé, according to most accounts), and the regime has not condemned that by punishing the guilty parties but rather has tried to excuse it ("poussée de fièvre", dixit Gbagbo). And that may encourage more attacks there (and elsewhere), complicated by the fact that Liberians have since the beginning been encouraged to take part in the problems there.
"Young Patriots" demonstrating 19/3/2005 in the West at Duékoué (near Logoualé)
against the French military presence among the UN peace-keeping forces
against the French military presence among the UN peace-keeping forces
9) At several points, the FANCI are trying irritation movements and try-ons against the UN troops. Either side could commit an error leading to a boil-over against Licorne-ONUCI and others in Abidjan.
10) The west, particularly around Gagnoa, Daloa, etc., especially the peasants and young people, has been politicised by the “patriots”, almost as much as the Abidjan student movement. This could lead to almost anything, but already there have been human rights incidents and deaths.
11) The FANCI have stopped at least one tanker of fuel moving up to rebel-held Bouna which needs it for their electricity generators. This has led to a northern threat of an attack against Bondoukou, which, if it took place, could lead to any sort of an escalation. I do not think the UN has yet been able to resolve this problem which is yet another provocation.
Flashback: Violence at the BIMA French military camp near the airport, 24/1/2003.
Ivorian forces were present as spectators.
Ivorian forces were present as spectators.
12) The French have said in rather clear terms that they are now not able to assure the safety of French and eligibles in Abidjan, if it goes bad. They may not be able to hold the airport and may not be able to mount rescue operations for those in danger, as in November and earlier, in January 2003. For some time they have, therefore, been telling French citizens not to come to RCI for any reason whatsoever.
Flashback to the "Young Patriots" demonstration at the airport on 31/1/2003
as many expatriates sought to flee the country.
as many expatriates sought to flee the country.
13) With MOD troops busy in other losing wars, the Brits themselves cannot mount yet another evacuation as in November (which was supposed to be a one-off show). Others (even the Americans) have only a handful of commandos, not even enough for diplomatic protection. They do not even have enough troops to guard assembly points which, this time, at their "town hall meeting” on Thursday, have been exceptionally announced ahead of happenings.
14) Nothing can be put forward to give reassurance about the future security situation of expats in Abidjan. True, it's not as dangerous here for expat kids as in the Minnesota or other American schools, inner cities or suburbs, or for expat workers as the oil region of Nigeria. BUT if the streets go bad, the police and military are not likely to help expats at all (perhaps the contrary, as in November) and the French troops will have enough problems of their own. The general insecurity is not helped by the fact that hardened criminals have been let out of the Yopougon prison, on the most recent occasion with national TV covering the event live!!
15) If the young thugs and followers are again called into the streets of Abidjan, there could well be anarchy and violence such as not witnessed before. Nobody can be sure of reining them in. The more so as young RDR people are saying that they are poor also, and next time they too will "eat", and not just from French businesses and homes.
Flashback: Blé Goudé's Anti-Marcoussis demonstration in the Plateau, 1/2/2003
16) The tendency of President Gbagbo towards Mugabeism, letting the country go to ruin, in the quest for some sort of self-assertion and independence from the French, is probably just seen as a sad reality in London, but not as their motivation.
I have no doubt forgotten to mention significant things, like the economic mess which can bring social problems and disturbances in its train. Strikes have already been announced, and even police demonstrated this past week.
It does not look good. Maybe after Pretoria things will improve. None of us has the gift of prophecy and the British Foreign and Commonweath Office has surely decided, as they said, to just act on the side of caution for the sake of their Embassy staff and those other Brits and protected citizens prepared and able to heed its advice.
